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In November 2015, Bill Shorten declared that, if elected, his government would provide $100 million towards the construction of a new Townsville football stadium. The Queensland Labor government would match the funding. The stadium would primarily serve as the home ground for the newly crowned NRL Premiership winners, the North Queensland Cowboys (Australian Labor Party (ALP) 2015). In the months leading up to the 2016 federal election, Shorten continued to promote his stadium proposal, challenging the Coalition to equal his commitment (Peel 2016) . Business analysts criticised Labor's plan, while the Coalition remained uncommitted (Ludlow 2016) . During the fourth week of the election campaign, after the Queensland government announced it would increase its funding to $140 million, Malcolm Turnbull matched Shorten's stadium promise as part of a broader 'City Deal' for Townsville. The State's Assistant Minister for North Queensland welcomed this new bipartisanship, while criticising the time it took Turnbull to make his promise (Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) 2016; Liberal Party of Australia (LPA) 2016b).
Townsville's football stadium illustrates some of the ways in which federalism and party competition interact in Australian federal elections. The fact that Labor controlled the State government gave federal Labor the possibility of an initiative that created policy and electoral dilemmas for the federal Coalition. As events transpired, the Queensland government was able to leverage State infrastructure funding from both federal major parties. Had the Queensland government been in Liberal-National Party (LNP) hands, as was the case until early 2015, the dynamics of the stadium decision would have been quite different.
While the interplay between Australian federal and State governments influences the behaviour of political parties in federal elections, the results of this interplay on voters should not be assumed to be defined by State borders.
1 Any positive effects of the Townsville stadium deal, for example, may have been limited to voters in the Townsville region and not spread across Queensland (QLD) (supporters of the Brisbane Broncos and Gold Coast Titans may have been indifferent or even hostile to the attention given to the Cowboys). Alternatively, the positive effects may have extended across the border to rugby league-loving voters in New South Wales (NSW).
These may seem obvious points; however, election commentary in Australia often implicitly assumes that political events that occur within a particular State affect patterns of voting only of that State, that the effects stop at the borders, and that the resulting State by State outcomes matter for the results of House of Representative elections. These assumptions are, for example, found in the commentaries on individual States in previous edited collections on federal elections since the late 1990s. There is little evidence for or against these assumptions. No systematic comparative testing of the impact of State voting patterns on federal elections has been conducted during the last two decades.
This chapter attempts to re-open the question of whether States matter for Australian federal elections, by focusing on the 2016 election. Since Senate elections are covered elsewhere in this book (Green, Chapter 8), this chapter focuses on the contest for House of Representative seats. The chapter also primarily focuses on the contest for the Treasury benches between Labor and the Coalition, with some attention paid to the Greens, the only other party to stand candidates in all 150 House of Representative seats in 2016. We begin by reviewing the development of debates in Australian political science over the impact of State voting on federal elections. The chapter then outlines four potential factors that could produce State voting variations. We use three of these factors to identify the States that should have been expected to produce better and worse results for the Coalition and Labor. The chapter presents the results of a detailed analysis of State-by-State voting patterns in the 2013 and 2016 House of Representative elections. These results suggest that the States had a modest impact on the outcome of the election, but that electorate level effects were stronger. None of the possible explanations for State differences in 2016 works particularly well. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the need for future research in this area.
One election or eight? The Australian debate
Until the 1970s, Australian federal elections were overwhelmingly seen as national events. The view that the States might have an effect on federal election outcomes was largely ignored or dismissed (Sharman 1975: 16-18 ). This view became much more contentious from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. Debate over the impact of the States was sparked by a broader discussion of the concepts and methods of analysis employed by Malcolm Mackerras, then Australia's leading psephologist (see Goot 2016) . Reviewing two-party preferred results for the 1977 federal election, Mackerras (1978a: 135) concluded that 'one must be impressed by the similarity of response regardless of which part of Australia the voter inhabited. State differences seem to me to be negligible, not important'. Australia, he argued earlier in the same article, 'is pretty much one nation electorally', a phrase he repeated in response his critics later in the same year (ibid.: 133; 1978b: 335) .
In a rejoinder, Campbell Sharman criticised Mackerras's focus on the two-party preferred vote, arguing that once the magnitude and direction of State variations in first preference votes were taken into account, the States clearly did matter (1978: 338-39) . It was a matter of 'perception and judgement' as to whether the effects of the States constituted a 'glass … half empty or half full'. Several years later, Owen Hughes sought greater precision on the issue of State variation versus national uniformity via a series of tests comparing standard deviations in the vote. The result, he claimed, was that the national uniformity glass was 'shown to be empty ' (1984: 116 Just when Leithner seemed to have settled the debate-there have been no more recent systematic attempts to assess the impact of the States on voting in federal elections-the edited federal election book series began to include chapters on individual States, a practice that persisted until the volume on the 2013 federal election (Bean et al. 1998; Jaensch with Miragliotta and Wear 2015) . While these chapters contain interesting contextual material, they assume an importance for the States that Leithner had effectively debunked. Moreover, the practice of various authors focusing on different individual States ran the risk of ad hoc and post hoc explanations of apparent variations in voting across the States. Events in a particular State appeared important only because voters in that State later voted in a particular way, while similar events in other States were implicitly deemed unimportant because voters had voted in a different way.
To avoid these traps, the rest of this chapter will identify some general explanations of possible inter-State variations in voting at the 2016 federal election, and then critically test these using systematic electoratelevel data.
Why might the States have mattered in 2016?
International comparative findings on regional voting, along with previous Australian studies, suggest four factors that may have caused the States to have an impact on voting in the 2016 federal election: socioeconomic and/or ethnolinguistic diversity across States; differences in State economic performance; the partisan complexion and popularity of State governments; and direct campaign appeals to voters in specific States.
Socioeconomic and/or ethnolinguistic diversity is unlikely to have been a factor in 2016. Compared with other federations and countries with strong regional identities, Australia is demographically uniform. While the States have some minor peculiarities (see Aroney, Prasser and Taylor 2012) , they lack the strong differences associated with regional impacts on national elections. In addition, there is little evidence that any Statebased demographic variations that do exist translate into the lasting communal commitments to particular political parties that are found in some other parts of the world (Johnston and Pattie 2006: 83-84 ). Instead, support for different parties across the Australian States tends to cluster around a national mean (Sharman and Moon 2003: 241-43; Smith 2001: 284-87) . As Table 9 .1 shows, the average Labor vote at State elections over the past 20 years has varied by just 5.5 per cent, from a low in NSW (36.7 per cent) to a high in Victoria (VIC) (42.2 per cent). The Coalition parties (in their various State guises) have registered a larger 11.5 per cent range; however, if the small Territories are excluded, this is reduced to 5.7 per cent, from Tasmania's (TAS) low (37.5 per cent) to VIC's high (43.2 per cent). Table 9 .1 also demonstrates that the average differences between the major parties in each State are equally small. There is little indication that voters in any of the States think 'We are a Labor State' or 'We vote Coalition here'.
The second possible explanation for State effects is economic. Given the centrality of economic management to Australian federal elections (Bean and McAllister 2015: 418-21) , and the variable economic performance of different Australian States, we might expect voters in States with weaker economic performance to be more likely to vote against the party in government than voters in States experiencing a strong economy (Painter 1993: 136; Johnston and Pattie 2006: 86) . This explanation rests on the assumption that significant numbers of voters in each State vote according to their retrospective judgements of the government of the day's economic performance (Fiorina 1981 ). A third explanation has to do with the impact of State governments. One version of this explanation is that some voters vote in federal elections to gain some protection against the party in government in their State (Painter 1993: 137) . Examining the first five elections of the HawkeKeating era, Martin Painter found that 'support for a party [at a federal election] is higher where that party is in opposition in the state, and lower where it is in government ' (1993: 135) . A variation in this explanation factors in the popularity of State governments. Examining the 1990 federal election, Bean and Butler (1991: 128) observed pro-Labor swings in the three States with popular Labor or unpopular Coalition State governments and anti-Labor swings in the three States with unpopular Labor governments.
Both versions of the State government explanation take the fortunes of the parties contesting federal elections out of their own hands. The same cannot be said for the fourth explanation. The federal parties determine their own policy emphases and choose whether to target specific policies aimed at voters in particular States and regions. Targeted campaigning may reinforce existing patterns of State support; however, comparative experience suggests that parties can also strategically craft their campaign messages to make gains in territory held by their opponents (Johnston and Pattie 2006: 87) .
What would each of the last three explanations predict about the pattern of votes across States in the 2016 federal election? On the first measure, Turnbull and Shorten spent roughly as much time in four States-QLD, SA, TAS and the ACT-as their proportions of House of Representative seats would dictate (see Table 9 .3). They both visited VIC less often than might have been expected, given the number of seats at stake there. Perhaps this reflected VIC's electoral geography, which meant that very few seats were realistically up for grabs across the State. Equally, they both visited the NT more than its two seats might have deserved. The main differences between the two leaders occurred in Shorten's relatively high presence in NSW electorates and relatively low presence in WA. This suggests that Labor was hoping to win seats in NSW, but had less optimism about picking up WA seats. Examination of the policy announcements made during the campaign by the Coalition, Labor and the Greens indicates that, while States have a place in the party's strategic campaigning, they do not occupy a central place. We categorised all policy announcements of the three parties posted on their federal election websites as either national or regional. Policies were categorised as having a national focus if they were addressed generically to Australian voters, or described initiatives targeted at the country as a whole, such as the Coalition's general 'jobs and growth' policies or Labor's 'save Medicare' policies. We included policies as national rather than regional, even if they included specific locations simply to indicate where wider policies would apply. Thus, for example, the Coalition's 'funding for facilities to support children needing palliative care, such as Hummingbird House in Queensland, Bear Cottage in New South Wales, and Very Special Kids in Victoria' (LPA 2016c) and the Greens' commitment to 'stop runaway tree-clearing across Australia, including in Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia' (Australian Greens 2016b) were all classified as national policy initiatives. In some cases, such as Labor's commitment to fast-track 'national infrastructure projects', these indicative lists seemed carefully crafted to include an example from every State (ALP 2016c).
Policies were classified as regional only if they included commitments exclusively targeted at particular subnational locations. This included policies that had a national focus, but also explicit regional elements, such as the Coalition's policy on the Great Barrier Reef, which referred to the Reef 's value for 'millions of Australians' and the 'Australian economy', but also included promises of specific projects in local north Queensland communities (LPA 2016d).
The majority of policy announcements in the 2016 federal election were geographically generic. Of 36 Coalition policy statements during the campaign, 26 were national and 10 regionally specific (LPA 2016a).
Roughly the same proportion of Labor's '100 Positive Policies'-25 out of the 100-included a specific regional focus (ALP 2016a). The regional targets of the Australian Greens' policies were more difficult to quantify; however, Greens' policies addressing specific regions seemed to be even less common than those of the major parties (Australian Greens 2016a).
The targets of regional policy announcements in 2016 were rarely individual States. In some cases, the targets covered wider regions, as in Labor's 'Northern Australia-A Tourism Powerhouse', which promised initiatives for parts of QLD, the NT and WA (ALP 2016b). More commonly, regional policies concerned infrastructure or environmental projects targeted at specific locations within States, such as the Coalition's 'City Deal for Western Sydney' (LPA 2016e). To the extent that the parties addressed voters as citizens who had State-wide loyalties and interests, they mostly did so via tailored versions of their national policy announcements. These documents were based on generic templates, but included claims about the impact of national policies on the particular State to which they were targeted, using State-based data on economic indicators, education participation and the like (see e.g. ALP 2016c).
In numerical terms, the Coalition paid particular policy attention to QLD, which was the target of five of its 10 regional policy announcements. Labor also paid more attention to QLD than the other States, including it in nine of 25 announcements. Both parties spread their remaining State policy appeals relatively evenly among the States. Unlike the Coalition, Labor released policies aimed directly at NT and ACT voters. Counting policy announcements says something about the emphases of the competing parties; however, it ignores the content and significance of particular announcements. In SA, for example, the Coalition and Labor presented quite similar plans for new defence-related shipbuilding, transport improvements and steel manufacture (LPA 2016f; ALP 2016c) . Given the State's precarious economic position, these plans were likely to be more salient to SA voters than any number of other regionally based policies. By the same token, the fact that the two major parties closely matched each other's policies for SA probably effectively neutralised any electoral advantage either might have gained. Source . Authors .
The potential effects of State-based factors on voting in the 2016 federal election are summarised in State voting patterns at the 2016 federal election
Arguments about whether or not federal election results and swings are uniform or vary between States are often intertwined with arguments about whether to use two-party preferred votes or first preference votes as the relevant measure (see Goot 2016) . As Sharman pointed out almost four decades ago (1978: 337), the two measures may give very different impressions of the election result. In this section, we present both twoparty preferred and first preference results, first comparing the mean results for each State and then augmenting these with some measures of the dispersion of the vote across electorates within each State. The results discussed in the following paragraphs have been calculated using official Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) results (AEC 2016). Source . Compiled by authors using data from AEC (2016) . Table 9 .5 shows that, on a two-party preferred basis, the Coalition achieved its best results in WA (54.7 per cent) and QLD (54.1 per cent), and its worst results in the ACT (38.9 per cent), TAS (42.6 per cent) and the NT (42.9 per cent), a range of 15.8 per cent (WA to the ACT). If the ACT's two seats are ignored for the moment, the range falls to 12.1 per cent (WA to TAS).
The two-party preferred swings in every State were towards Labor; however, they also varied considerably, from 1.2 per cent in the ACT to 7.4 per cent in the NT. Excluding the small Territories for the moment, the swing ranged between 6.1 per cent in TAS to 1.6 per cent in VIC.
In three States (NSW, QLD and WA), the result of the swing was to reduce the Coalition's majority across the State, while the results in VIC, TAS and the NT increased slim two-party preferred majorities achieved by Labor at the 2013 federal election. The ACT swing built on an already strong Labor base from 2013. Thus, the only State to move from having a notional Coalition majority in 2013 to a notional Labor majority in 2016 was SA.
As Table 9 .6 shows, however, the two-party preferred result in SA hides a rather startling loss of votes by all three of the parties that contested all House of Representative seats across Australia. Calculating the size of the swings as a proportion of their 2013 primary votes in SA, the Coalition lost 21.1 per cent of its primary vote, Labor lost 11.8 per cent and the Greens 25.3 per cent. Without good survey research, it is hard to know exactly where all of these votes went, but many of them appear to have transferred to the Nick Xenophon Team, which ran candidates in every SA seat at its first House of Representative election and secured 21.3 per cent of the primary vote in that State (see also Raue, Chapter 7, this volume; Kefford, Chapter 15, this volume).
In all the other States, the first preference swings involve losses for the Coalition and increased support for both Labor and the Greens. Labor's gains ranged from a modest 0. How uniform was the swing within and between States in 2016? Figure 9 .3 presents more box plots for each State, this time summarising variation in the two-party preferred swing. It shows two patterns. In TAS, SA, the NT and the ACT, the swings in every seat were against the Coalition, albeit to varying degrees. In the remaining States, most seats swung to Labor, but at least some recorded shifts to the Coalition. In VIC, one quarter of seats did so. The results in Table 9 .7 suggest that electorate-level variations are more important than State variations for both the results of particular elections and for swings between them. State variations explained less than 10 per cent of the major parties' first preference votes in 2016. State variations accounted for a little more of the variation in votes in 2013 but, in both elections, they were dwarfed by electorate variations. Interestingly, while electorate variations were also most important for the Greens, State variations had a stronger impact than for the major parties. Perhaps the explanation is that the Greens are primarily associated with the Senate rather than the House of Representatives, so that the Greens' House of Representative vote is influenced by the varying profiles and performance of the Green Senators from different States. State variations also lay behind some of the two-party preferred swing recorded between 2013 and 2016, although once again electorate variations seemed a stronger influence by some margin. These results suggest that, at the very least, State differences should not be dismissed out of hand as a factor in the 2016 federal election.
Conclusion
At the 2016 federal election, all the States registered two-party preferred swings against the Coalition. This apparent homogeneity masks a range of variations between them. These included the different sizes of the swing between States, the uniformity of the swing within them, the peculiarity of SA's first preference swings, and inter-State differences in both the twoparty preferred and first preference outcomes once the dust had settled.
These differences are difficult to explain in a coherent and parsimonious way. This is partly because Australian political science has not paid attention in recent decades to systematic State-based differences in federal election results and their possible causes. The potential causes of variation outlined earlier in this chapter can only be applied in a loose way to the results. The comparatively large swing against the Coalition in TAS could be seen as resulting from a combination of the State's economic woes and its unpopular State Coalition government. The much smaller Victorian swing might be seen as a result of that State's improving economy and the presence of a State Labor government. The other, less consistent State cases are impossible to fit into such a framework. None of the suggested factors-State economic fortunes, State politics or federal campaigningappears to provide sufficient explanation on its own. Eight outcomes from one election is too small a number to develop a solid understanding of how the factors might interact, or which other factors might be missing from the analysis. More analysis needs to be done to explain the sorts of similarities and differences between States that this chapter has identified.
